你后悔杀一人救五人吗？

在做出功利性和道义性的决定后产生的情感和认知悔过

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions

【摘要】 牺牲的道德困境，即选择杀死一个人将拯救多个人，在定义上是次优的：无论哪种方式都有人死亡。那么，决策者可能会对这些决定感到后悔。过去的研究将情感后悔、对决定的负面情绪与认知后悔、关于决定可能如何不同的想法区分开来。道德判断的经典双过程模型表明，情感加工驱动特征性的义务论决策来拒绝结果最大化的伤害，而认知审议驱动特征性的功利主义决策来支持结果最大化的伤害。与该模型一致，我们发现做出或想象做出牺牲功利主义判断的人比做出或想象做出道义两难判断的人可靠地表达了相对更多的情感后悔，有时表达的认知后悔相对较少。换句话说，与拒绝结果最大化伤害的人相比，支持通过伤害来挽救生命的人通常对他们的决定感到更加痛苦，但不太愿意改变它。

【关键词】情感后悔；认知后悔；双进程模型；道德困境；后悔。

[Abstract] Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

[Key words] Affective regret; Cognitive regret; Dual-process model; Moral dilemmas; Regret.

论文全文: Goldstein-Greenwood, J., Conway, P., Summerville, A., & Johnson, B. N. (2020). (How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions. Personality & social psychology bulletin, 46(9), 1303–1317.

DOI: 10.1177/0146167219897662