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谁好心把法官回复海明的文件给传上来？现在徐大棚一直憋着，那就先看海明地上打滚也行 ...
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呵呵。闲着也是闲着。
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- 回复 再来看戏
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广告: 我和法官心心相通啊：
他说， The argument fails.
我说，‘有这么讲理的吗？’
他是书面语，要抑制排除情绪。
我就不用管那么多了，就图个痛快，想怎么骂就 ...
等中文
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- 我和法官心心相通啊：
再来看戏: 自动翻译不堪卒读
英文原文：
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (ECF)
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:
SANG LAN, : 11 Civ. ...
他说， The argument fails.
我说，‘有这么讲理的吗？’
他是书面语，要抑制排除情绪。
我就不用管那么多了，就图个痛快，想怎么骂就怎么骂桑黄海这几个小丑。
这世界上，你可以不讲理，但办不成事。
- 回复 再来看戏
- 自动翻译不堪卒读
英文原文：
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (ECF)
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:
SANG LAN, : 11 Civ. 2870 (LBS) (JCF)
:
Plaintiff, : REPORT AND
: RECOMMENDATION
:
-against -:
: AOL TIME WARNER, INC., THE UNITED : STATES GYMNASTICS FEDERATION d/b/a :USA GYMNASTICS, TIG INSURANCE : COMPANY, TIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE : SOLUTIONS, RIVERSTONE CLAIMS : MANAGEMENT, LLC, TED TURNER, K.S. : LIU, GINA LIU AKA K.S. GINA HIU-: HUNG, WINSTON SIE, HUGH MO, JOHN : DOES AND JANE DOES #1 THROUGH 15, : INCLUSIVE, :
:
Defendants. : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -: TO THE HONORABLE LEONARD B. SAND, U.S.D.J.:
Ming Hai, former attorney for the plaintiff, Sang Lan, moves
to set aside the settlement agreement with defendants Kao Sung Liu,
Gina Hiu-Hung Liu, and Hugh Mo, on the grounds that (1) the
defendants’ disclosure of the confidential settlement amount
constituted a material breach of the agreement, (2) the agreement
was obtained through misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence,
duress, “and other prohibited acts”, and (3) the agreement is
unconscionable, against public policy, and contradictory to Judge
Sand’s decision denying sanctions against Ms. Lan. For the
following reasons, the motion should be denied.
Background
On July 12, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiff Ms. Lan and Mr. Hai, her then-attorney, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 31, 2011, Mr. Hai filed a motion to withdraw as Ms. Lan’s counsel; I granted that motion on October 31, 2011, but retained jurisdiction over Mr. Hai in connection with the defendants’ motion for sanctions. On November 21, 2011, I issued a Report and Recommendation calling for the sanctions motion to be denied without prejudice to determination after trial.
On February 27, 2012, I held a settlement conference during which Mr. Hai and the defendants, in my presence, negotiated and agreed upon all the key terms contained in the settlement agreement at issue. The agreement required Mr. Hai to pay $5,000 and execute a signed Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing to be prepared by the defendants; as consideration, the defendants agreed to dismiss their sanctions motion against Mr. Hai with prejudice. (Stipulation of Partial Dismissal of Rule 11 Motion, attached as Exh. C to Declaration of Hugh H. Mo dated June 29, 2012 (“Mo Decl.”)). The settlement agreement clearly stated that, with the exception of the settlement amount, the agreement could be made publicly available and was subject to no restrictions as to confidentiality. (Settlement Agreement and Release, attached as Exh. C to Mo Decl., at 4).
On March 2, 2012, at 12:41 a.m., Mr. Hai sent an e-mail to Mr. Mo requesting that he reduce the previously agreed-upon settlement amount to $4,000, stating, “I did you a favor before that I didn’t even tell you [about].” (E-mail of Ming Hai dated March 2, 2012 (“Hai E-mail”), attached as Exh. B to Mo Decl.). Mr. Hai explained that he was once approached by two of Mr. Mo’s former clients from another matter who “wanted to sue [Mr. Mo] for dual representation and misrepresentation”; rather than commence litigation against Mr. Mo, however, Mr. Hai instead “worked out a deal” that avoided such a result. (Hai E-mail). Therefore, Mr. Hai explained, “I did [a] bad thing to you this time[;] I did something good last time. Please balance it out. Now it is tax time, [and] $1,000 really makes a big diff[e]rence for me.” (Hai E-mail). At 7:00 a.m. that same morning, Mr. Mo e-mailed the following response:
Re[garding] the payment, it is not negotiable. I am concern[ed] that you still do not appreciate the gravityof your wrongdoing against the Lius and me. I hope youappreciate that we decided to settle the Rule 11 [motion]with great reluctance, because what you did is simplyunforgivable. So consider yourself lucky that you areavoiding state court action and bar discipline which wehad every intention of pursuing if not for the settlement. I will forward the [settlement] papers by
10:30 a.m. and expect your signed copy by noon. (E-mail of Hugh Mo dated March 2, 2012 (“Mo E-mail”), attached as Exh. B to Mo Decl.). Mr. Hai claims, “I could not think rationally under th[ose] threats amongst other pressures and signed the self-incriminating Acknowledgement of Wrongdoings, admitting all the wrongs that I did not actually commit[].” (Affirmation dated May 11, 2012 (“Hai Aff.”), ¶ 12). Later that day, the defendants filed the signed Stipulation of Settlement with the settlement amount redacted.
The following day, Mr. Hai faxed a letter to my chambers in which he stated:
I only agree[d] to sign the humiliating and
self-incriminating statements without changing even one
word[] because I hope that I may receive some leniency in
the monetary fine. Once the statements [are] made
public, my clients, practice[,] and my standing as a
professional in the Chinese community will be impacted.
. . . I would pray for that your honor may speak to Mr.
Mo, [and] fix the settlement amount as $4,000. I can pay
them by credit card or check today. (Letter of Ming Hai dated March 3, 2012 (“1st Hai Letter”), attached as Exh. B to Mo Decl.). Less than one hour later, Mr. Hai faxed a second letter to my chambers in which he explained that he had decided to pay Mr. Mo $5,000 as originally agreed and requested that I disregard his prior letter. (Letter of Ming Hai dated March 3, 2012). Mr. Hai now alleges that, after he faxed the first letter, “[the] defendants found out quickly, and called me in a menacing manner, demanding me not to send letters to Judge Francis anymore and take it back or something bad will happen to me.” (Hai Aff., ¶ 13).
On March 4, 2012, at Mr. Hai’s request, the defendants modified the Stipulation of Settlement to include Mr. Hai’s law firm as a party to the settlement and resubmitted it to the Court. On March 6, 2012, Mr. Mo notified Mr. Hai and myself that, due to an error on the defendants’ part, the modified Stipulation of Settlement had been filed without the settlement amount redacted. (Letter of Hugh Mo dated March 6, 2012 and E-mail of Franklin K. Chiu dated March 6, 2012, both attached as Exh. F to Mo Decl.). A redacted copy of the settlement was immediately substituted in the public docket. However, Mr. Hai has submitted evidence showing that, shortly after the unredacted version of the agreement was filed, it was republished on the World Wide Web. (Sample internet postings, attached as Exhs. A-C to Hai Aff., at 1-6).
On May 9, 2012, Judge Sand denied the defendants’ motion for sanctions against Ms. Lan. The next day, Mr. Hai filed a letter request to “rescind, cancel and void the Acknowledgement of Wrongdoing [and] Stipulation of Settlement,” and he filed the instant motion on May 14, 2012.1
Mr. Hai alleges that the defendants’ disclosure of the settlement amount was a material breach of the settlement agreement
1
Although Mr. Hai’s motion is based in large part on theinadvertent revelation of the settlement amount, his publicly filedmotion papers reveal the same information.
that “completely destroyed the very intent, essence and fundamentals for entering into such an agreement.” (Hai Aff., ¶ 2). He also claims that the Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing was published in the Chinese media “in such a malicious way” as to constitute misrepresentation by the defendants. (Hai Aff., ¶¶ 6, 9). Third, Mr. Hai alleges that the defendants obtained the agreement and Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing “through undue influence[], threats, duress[,] and other prohibited acts” -¬namely, by providing him with only one and a half hours to review and sign the settlement paperwork while reminding him that, by settling the case, he was “avoiding state court action and bar discipline,” and by allegedly threatening him during the phone call of March 3, 2012. (Hai Aff., ¶¶ 10-11, 13). Mr. Hai also contends that the “overreaching and unconscionable acts by [the] defendants” and “illegal things [that] have happened” constitute a “manifest injustice” requiring that the agreement and Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing be set aside as unconscionable and against public policy. (Hai Aff., ¶¶ 15, 18, 20-21). Finally, Mr. Hai claims that the agreement and Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing should be “voided and rescinded” because it is “contradictory to Judge Sand’s ruling” denying sanctions. (Hai Aff., ¶ 15). Discussion
“Settlement agreements resolving litigation are governed by principles of ordinary contract law.” Curry v. New York City Police Department, 726 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 173 F.3d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1999)).
A. Material Breach
“It is well-settled that where performance of a contract is underway, only non-performance that rises to the level of a ‘material breach’ will justify rescission.” Knoll v. Equinox Fitness Clubs, No. 02 Civ. 9120, 2003 WL 23018807, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003) (citing Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000)). “A breach is material if it defeats the object of the parties in making the contract and ‘deprive[s] the injured party of the benefit that it justifiably expected.’” ESPN, Inc. v. Office of Commissioner of Baseball, 76 F. Supp. 2d 383, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.16 (3d ed. 1999)); see also Krumme, 238 F.3d at 143 (“Under New York law, rescission is an extraordinary remedy, appropriate only where the breach is found to be material and willful, or, if not willful, so substantial and fundamental as to strongly tend to defeat the object of the parties in making the contract.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the facts indicate that the defendants’ disclosure of the confidential settlement amount materially breached the settlement agreement. The confidentiality of the settlement amount was very important to Mr. Hai, and he has been irreparably harmed by its disclosure. Moreover, it is impossible for the defendants to cure the failure because the disclosed information cannot be made private again. See Rivera v. Sharp, No. 1:08-cv-20, 2010 WL 2555065, at *3 (D. Virgin Islands, June 21, 2010) (citing Gambale
v. Deutsche, 377 F.3d 133, 144 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004)).
B. Waiver and Estoppel
Even where there is a material breach, however, “there can be no rescission where the breach of contract . . . has been waived by the party who has been wronged.” New York Telephone Co. v. Jamestown Telephone Corp., 282 N.Y. 365, 372, 26 N.E.2d 295, 297 (1940). Where a party “has actual knowledge of [a] breach and continues to perform under and accepts the benefits of the contract, such continuing performance constitutes a waiver of the breach.” National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d sub nom Yaeger v. National Westminster, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Emerson Electric Co. v. Asset Management Associates of New York, Inc., No. 08-CV-1489, 2012 WL 976051, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. March 20, 2012) (“‘Acceptance of benefit under the contract with knowledge of the wrong constitutes a waiver of the wrong.’”) (quoting New York Telephone Co., 282 N.Y. at 372, 26 N.E.2d at 297-98); Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 692 F. Supp. 194, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that the “right to rescind [a] contract must be exercised promptly after [the] party learns of [the] wrong[,] and acceptance of benefits under [the] contract with knowledge of [the] wrong constitutes waiver” (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, “a plaintiff is estopped from pursuing a breach of contract claim when such plaintiff has ‘accepted the benefits of [the] agreement, despite knowledge of a breach . . . .’” Gallegos v. Top RX, Inc., No. 04-CV-773A, 2008 WL 4279526, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008) (quoting Chapin v. Chapin, 295 A.D.2d 389, 391, 744 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (2d Dep’t 2002)).
“A waiver will not be inferred from silence or mere inaction,” Chapin, 295 A.D.2d at 391, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83; rather, waiver “requires that the party to be estopped be aware of certain facts and, being aware of them, elect not to take advantage of them.” Gallegos, 2008 WL 4279526, at *13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n addition to awareness of the facts upon which the alleged breach is predicated, a plaintiff’s forbearance in seeking judicial relief timely must also be shown to be a voluntary and intentional decision” to establish waiver. Id. at *14.
In this case, Mr. Hai, upon learning of the defendants’ breach, did not take advantage of those facts by timely asserting his right to rescind the agreement; instead, he voluntarily and intentionally elected to finalize the settlement by sending full payment to the defendants as agreed and accepting the benefit promised to him -- the dismissal of the defendants’ motion for sanctions. Mr. Hai continued to enjoy this benefit and did not protest the defendants’ disclosure of the settlement amount for over two months, until, apparently emboldened by Judge Sand’s decision denying sanctions against Ms. Lan, Mr. Hai concluded that he too was no longer at risk for sanctions as a matter of law, and thus, no longer needed the benefit he had bargained for and accepted from the defendants over the course of the preceding nine weeks.2 Under these circumstances, Mr. Hai is not entitled to seek rescission of the agreement. See, e.g., Accusoft Corporation v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of rescission claim where party breached confidentiality provision of settlement agreement and non-breaching party continued to accept
2 This point is not lost on the defendants, who arguepersuasively that, “in order to renege on the settlement agreement,” “[Mr.] Hai now attempts to recast what has transpiredin light of Judge Sand’s decision that denied sanctions against hisformer client . . . . During the two months from the settlementconference until Judge Sand’s decision, [Mr.] Hai has not complained or challenged the validity of the settlement. None of his correspondence with this Court and the [d]efendants expressedany concern regarding the publication of the Acknowledgment ofWrongdoing, the inadvertent disclosure of the settlement amount, oralleged duress.” (Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition toMing Hai’s Motion to Set Aside the Settlement Agreement, at 4).
benefits of agreement for several months until “it had obtained all
the benefits from the settlement agreement that it could” before
seeking rescission). By continuing to perform his obligations
under and accept the benefit of the agreement, rather than promptly
exercising his right to rescind in light of the defendants’ known
breach, Mr. Hai waived, and is now estopped from asserting, his
claim for rescission on that basis.3
C. Misrepresentation/Fraudulent Inducement
Mr. Hai next argues that, although the settlement agreement
did not require that the Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing be kept
confidential, he did “not expect[] and anticipate[]” that it “would
be used [i.e., published] in such a malicious way” by the
defendants, (Hai Aff., ¶ 9), who, Mr. Hai alleges, “used their
connections with people in high places in China politics . . . in
3 Even if Mr. Hai had not waived his rescission claim, itwould be barred by the election of remedies doctrine. “A partycannot ‘elect to continue with the contract, continue to receivebenefits from it, and thereafter bring an action for rescission ortotal breach.’” ESPN, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (quoting Macfarlane &Associates, Inc. v. Noxell Corp., 93 Civ. 5192, 1994 WL 369324, *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1994)). Where, as here, “a party with the rightto terminate [the agreement] chooses instead to continue, the onlyinference to be drawn is that the party will derive a worthwhilebenefit from its contractual relationship. Therefore, the party’selection to continue rather than end the contract essentially mootsits legal justification for termination. Once a party recognizescontractual benefits in the wake of a material breach, thatparticular breach can no longer be considered the antithesis of thecontract, and it can no longer serve as the basis for termination.”Id.
setting off a media war designed to ruin [him] and destroy [his] law practice.” (Hai Aff., ¶ 7). Mr. Hai claims that the defendants did not “gain [his] informed consent to th[ese] kinds of strategies and conducts,” because “their entire plan was to get [him] into this trap by trickery and deceit.” (Hai Aff., ¶ 9).
“‘The elements of a claim for rescission based on fraud are misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact; an intent to deceive; and an injury resulting from justifiable reliance by the aggrieved party.’” Druck Corp. v. Macro Fund Ltd., 290 F. App’x 441, 445 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)). In addition, “a party seeking rescission of a contract on the ground that it was fraudulently induced must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation was ‘material’ in that it influenced the party’s decision to enter into the contract.” Sheffield Commercial Corp.
v. Clemente, 792 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1986).
Here, Mr. Hai cannot establish even the first element of his claim. As the defendants correctly point out, the settlement agreement clearly states that both Chinese and English versions of the Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing would be filed with the Court and made available to the public. Mr. Hai was well aware of this fact and anticipated that its publication would negatively affect his reputation as an attorney in the Chinese community, as he acknowledged in his letter to my chambers on March 3, 2012. (1st Hai Letter (“Once the statements [are] made public, my clients, practice[,] and my standing as a professional in the Chinese community will be impacted.”)). That the settlement agreement and Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing were published or discussed more extensively in the Chinese media or caused more damage to Mr. Hai’s reputation than he expected does not amount to a misrepresentation by the defendants. See, e.g., Powell v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When a party makes a deliberate, strategic choice to settle, a court cannot relieve him of that choice simply because his assessment of the consequences was incorrect.”). Nor are there any facts indicating concealment or nondisclosure by the defendants that would sustain a claim of misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement. Accordingly, Mr. Hai cannot rescind the agreement on this basis, and his claim must fail.
D. Undue Influence, Threats, and Duress
Mr. Hai also alleges that the defendants coerced him into entering into the settlement agreement “through undue influences, threats, duress[,] and other prohibited acts.” (Hai Aff., ¶ 10). Specifically, Mr. Hai alleges that, by providing him with a limited time to review and sign the settlement paperwork while reminding him that, by settling the case, he was “avoiding state court action and bar discipline,” the defendants made an “illegal” “threat[] of attorney discipline in a pending civil matter” “in order to compel [him] to agree to pay $5,000,” “thereby inviting [him] to bargain away the grievance” in violation of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct. (Hai Aff., ¶ 11; Affirmation of Ming Hai dated July 12, 2012 (“Hai Reply Aff.”), ¶¶ 2-5). Mr. Hai also alleges that, after he had signed the agreement, the defendants threatened him during their phone call of March 3, 2012 by “demanding [him] not to send letters to Judge Francis anymore and [to] take it back or something bad will happen to [him].” (Hai Aff., ¶ 13). Mr. Hai claims that the “defendants’ threats ha[d] already put [him] in a state of extreme anxiety, [and he] could not think rationally under th[ose] threats amongst other pressures and signed the self-incriminating Acknowledgement of Wrongdoings, admitting all the wrongs that [he] did not actually commit[].” (Hai Aff., ¶ 12).
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Hai’s failure to seek rescission promptly on the basis of undue influence or duress constitutes a waiver barring his claims. See, e.g., VKK Corp. v. National Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he person claiming duress must act promptly to repudiate the contract . . . or he will be deemed to have waived his right to do so . . . [and] to have ratified it. A party may ratify a contract . . . entered into under duress by intentionally accepting benefits under the contract, by remaining silent or acquiescing in the contract for a period of time after he has the opportunity to avoid it, or by acting upon it, performing under it, or affirmatively acknowledging it.” (internal citations and punctuation omitted)); 2 Broadway
L.L.C. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital L.L.C., No. 00 Civ. 5773, 2001 WL 410074, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Where a party has accepted the benefits of an agreement, and then seeks to repudiate the agreement on the ground of coercion, it must do so in timely fashion or any objection is waived and the agreement is ratified.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Mr. Hai’s coercion-based claims also fail on the merits. “Under New York law, a party claiming that it was unduly influenced to enter a contractual relationship must prove that it contracted under circumstances indicating that a ‘relationship of control’ existed and that the ‘stronger’ of the two parties had exerted influence over the other to ‘destroy the weaker party’s free will and substitute it for the will of the [other].’” In re Yohannes, No. 06 Civ. 461, 2007 WL 2034301, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2007) (quoting Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 393
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)). “This is a substantial burden for a party to meet.” Id. “Essentially, a party seeking to invalidate a contract must demonstrate that it was manipulated into signing a contract as a consequence of conduct worse than even pressure, no matter how bad because undue influence is tantamount to a species of cheating.” Id. (internal citations and punctuation omitted). The burden faced by Mr. Hai in proving duress “is even greater,” as he must show: “(1) a threat, (2) unlawfully made, (3) which caused involuntary acceptance of contractual terms, (4) because the circumstances permitted no alternative.” Id. (quoting Mathias v. Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
To the extent Mr. Hai’s undue influence and duress claims are premised on the defendants’ alleged violations of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct, they fail: the defendants have violated no rule in this jurisdiction. Tellingly, Mr. Hai does not cite to any controlling authority in support of his argument, because, in fact, there is none. The relevant New York rule, DR 7-105(A), “prohibits the presentation and threatened presentation of criminal charges when the purpose is to effect a resolution of a civil dispute; the disciplinary rule does not embrace administrative or disciplinary charges that may be threatened or presented in connection with a civil dispute, regardless of purpose.” New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 772, at *1 (2003); see DR 7-105(A) (“A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”). The New York State Bar Association, addressing this very issue in 2003, “conclude[d] that the threatened or actual filing of complaints with . . . administrative agencies or disciplinary authorities lies outside the scope of DR 7-105(A). . . . [While] there exist ethics opinions in this and other jurisdictions [e.g., Nassau County, New York, and the States of Illinois and Maryland] in which the threatened filing of a complaint with an administrative agency or disciplinary authority has been held to violate DR 7-105(A) or its analogue . . . . we reject that general analogy in light of the specific language of DR 7-105(A), which concerns only “criminal charges.” Id. at *4. Thus, the alleged “threat” contained in Mr. Mo’s e-mail does not even rise to the level of attorney misconduct, let alone the threshold required to establish a claim of duress or undue influence.
These claims fare no better to the extent they are based on the defendants’ allegedly threatening phone call to Mr. Hai on March 3, 2012: Mr. Hai had already signed the agreement on the previous day. Although he characterizes his March 2, 2012 letter (that prompted the alleged phone call from the defendants) as “express[ing] [his] difficulty and frustration under pressures to sign” the agreement, it is more accurately described as an after-the-fact attempt to reduce the settlement amount to which Mr. Hai had already agreed. (1st Hai Letter (“I only agree to sign the humiliating and self-incriminating statements without changing even one word, because I hope that I may receive some leniency in the monetary fine. . . . I would pray for that your honor may speak to Mr. Mo, fix the settlement amount at $4,000.”)). In any event, whatever the content of the subsequent phone conversation between Mr. Hai and the defendants may have been, it cannot possibly provide the basis for Mr. Hai’s claim that the defendants obtained his signature to the agreement by exerting pressure upon him after he had already signed the agreement. Therefore, his undue influence and duress claims are meritless, and his motion to rescind the agreement on these grounds must be denied.
E. Unconscionability
Mr. Hai further contends that the agreement should be rescinded because it is unconscionable. “Unconscionability ‘requires some showing of an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’” In re Yohannes, 2007 WL 2034301, at *3 (quoting State v. Avco Financial Service, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 389, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “An unconscionable agreement has been described as one ‘such as no [person] in [his] senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair [person] would accept on the other,’ where the resulting inequality is ‘so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any [person] of common sense.’” Id. (quoting Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (1977)).
Mr. Hai’s unconscionability claim appears to rest on what he identifies as the “overreaching and unconscionable acts by [the] defendants,” which, in sum, amount to a “manifest injustice” warranting rescission. This argument fails. Mr. Hai, a practicing attorney, negotiated the settlement terms with the defendants in my presence and voluntarily signed the Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing in consideration of the defendant’s consent to dismissal with prejudice of their sanctions motion against him. The settlement terms are not unreasonably favorable to the defendants, nor do the surrounding circumstances suggest that Mr. Hai faced an absence of meaningful choice in entering into the agreement. Therefore, the agreement should not be set aside on the basis of unconscionability.
F. Public Policy
Mr. Hai also argues that the agreement should be set aside because it violates public policy. “For a contract to be void as against public policy, it must violate ‘the law of the State, whether found in the Constitution, statutes or decisions of the courts.’” Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 243, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Caruso, 73 N.Y.2d 74, 81, 538 N.Y.S.2d 217, 221 (1989)). Aside from his futile allegations concerning the defendants’ alleged violations of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Hai does not cite to a single statute, regulation, or court decision that would support voiding the settlement agreement.
G. Judge Sand’s Ruling
Finally, Mr. Hai argues that the settlement agreement should be rescinded because “it is contradictory to Judge Sand’s ruling” denying sanctions against Ms. Lan. (Hai Aff., ¶ 15; Hai Reply Aff., ¶¶ 45-57). Specifically, Mr. Hai contends that the “Acknowledgement of Wrongdoing is actually a statement of legal opinions by the parties which turns out to be wrong and contradictory to [Judge Sand’s] findings and conclusions of law” and, therefore, “must be declared incorrect.” (Hai Reply Aff., ¶¶ 48, 54, 49-57). However, the Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing is an apology from Mr. Hai to the defendants for his conduct, not a statement of law. Accordingly, it is not legally inconsistent with Judge Sand’s subsequent ruling. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Hai’s motion to rescind the settlement agreement (Docket no. 103) should be denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a), and 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have
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明海,前检察官原告,桑,动作
留出和解协议与被告花王唱刘,
吉娜:" hiu挂刘,休•莫,理由是(1)
被告披露机密和解金额
构成材料破坏了协议,(2)协议
是通过歪曲、欺诈、不正当影响。
胁迫,”和其他禁止行为”,和(3)协议
不合理的,对公共政策,和矛盾的判断
砂的决定拒绝制裁局域网女士。对于
以下原因,运动应该否认。
背景
2011年7月12日,被告提起一项运动对制裁原告局域网和海先生女士,她然后律师,依照规则11联邦民事诉讼规则。2011年8月31日,海先生提出了一项动议,撤退局域网的顾问女士;我认为运动2011年10月31日,但保留管辖海先生涉嫌与被告申请批准。2011年11月21日,我发表了一份报告,建议呼吁制裁运动被拒绝在不损害审判后确定。
2012年2月27日,我举行了一个和解会议期间,海先生和被告、在我面前、谈判和达成所有的关键术语包含在和解协议的问题。该协议要求海先生支付5000美元并执行一个签署了承认过错准备由被告人;当考虑,被告同意解散他们的制裁运动反对海先生与偏见。(规定的部分解雇规则11运动,附加作为展览。C声明的休•h•莫6月29日,2012(“莫Decl。”))。和解协议明确表示,除了和解金额,协议可能会公开并且服从没有限制以保密。(和解协议和释放,附加作为展览。C对莫Decl。在4)。
2012年3月2日,在41点,海发了一封电子邮件,要求他莫先生先前商定的和解金额减少至4000美元,他说:“我做了你一个忙之前,我甚至没有告诉你(有关)。“(电子邮件的明海过时的2012年3月2日(“海电子邮件”),附加作为展览。B莫Decl。)。海先生解释说,他曾经是接洽的莫先生的前两个客户从另一个问题“想苏[奥。莫]因为双表示法和误传”;而不是开始诉讼,然而,先生莫海先生相反“达成了一个协议”,避免了这样一个结果。(海电子邮件)。因此,海先生解释说,“我做了坏事,[a]你这一次[,]我最后一次做一件好事。请平衡。现在是税收时间,[而且]1000美元真的让一个大diff(e)芮妮对我来说。“(海电子邮件)。在那个早晨7:00,奥莫邮件以下响应:
再保险[garding]付款,这是没有商量余地的。我担心,你仍然(ed)不欣赏你的不当行为gravityof对刘家和我。我希望youappreciate,我们决定解决规则11[动作]与非常不情愿,因为你做的事情是simplyunforgivable。因此认为自己幸运,你areavoiding州法院的行动和酒吧的一餐的纪律,每个意愿追求如果没有结算。我将提出论文(定居点)
上午10点30分,期望你中午前签署了复制。(电子邮件的休•莫日期为2012年3月2日(“莫电子邮件”),附加作为展览。B莫Decl。)。海先生宣称,“我不能理性思考在th(ose)威胁在其他压力和签署了自我归罪的承认错误,承认所有的错误,事实上我并没有提交[]。“(肯定日期为2012年5月11日,(“海等于off。”),¶12)。那天晚些时候,被告提起诉讼的规定签订和解,和解金额修订。
第二天,海传真一封信给我的房间,他说:
我只同意[d]签署了屈辱和
自我归罪的语句不改变哪怕一个
字[],因为我希望我可以得到一些宽大处理的
货币好。一旦语句[是]了
公众,我的客户,实践[,]和我的站作为一个
专业在华人社区将会受到影响。
。。。我将为你的荣誉可能先生讲话。
莫,[和]修复和解金额为4000美元。我可以付
他们通过信用卡或支票今天。(信明日期为2012年3月3日,海(" 1日海字母”),附加作为展览。B莫Decl。)。不到一小时后,海先生第二封信传真到我的房间,他解释说,他已经决定将支付5000美元作为先生莫最初同意,要求我不顾他信之前。(信明海日期2012年3月3日)。海先生现在宣称,在他传真给第一个字母,“[]被告发现很快,叫我恐吓的方式,要求我不要发送信件法官弗朗西斯了并带回或坏事会发生在我身上。“(海等于off。,¶13)。
2012年3月4日,在海先生的要求,被告修改了规定的结算包括海先生的律师事务所作为党协议,提交到法院。2012年3月6日,奥莫通知和自己说,海先生,由于一个错误在被告的部分,修改后的规定的结算已被提交,没有和解金额修订。(信的休•莫日期为2012年3月6日和电子邮件的富兰克林•k•赵日期为2012年3月6日,两个附加作为展览。F对莫Decl。)。一个编辑副本的结算立即被替换公共记事表。然而,海先生已经提交的证据表明,后不久,为编辑版本的协议被提起,它被转载万维网上。(示例网络发帖,附加Exhs一样。得了,海等于off。,在1 - 6)。
2012年5月9日,法官砂否认了被告的运动对制裁局域网女士。第二天,海先生提交的一封信中要求“解除,取消和无效确认违法行为的[和]规定的结算”,他提出了即时运动5月14日,2012.1
海先生宣称被告”披露和解金额是一个重大违反和解协议
1
尽管海博的运动是在很大程度上根据theinadvertent启示的和解金额,他公开filedmotion论文显示相同的信息。
“完全摧毁了非常意图、本质和基本面为进入这样一个协议。“(海等于off。,¶2)。他还声称,承认过错发表在中国媒体“在这样一个恶意的方式”作为构成作错误被告。(海等于off。,¶¶6,9)。第三,海先生宣称被告获得协议和承认过错”通过不正当影响[],威胁,强迫[,]和其他被禁止的行为”——¬即,通过提供他只有一个半小时来审查和签署和解文书工作的同时,提醒他,通过解决此案,他是“避免国家的法庭行动和酒吧纪律”,并声称受到威胁他在电话的2012年3月3日。(海等于off。,¶¶10 - 11、13)。海先生还声称,“过度和不合理的行为通过[]被告”和“非法的事情(这)已经发生了“构成”清单不公正”要求的协议和承认不当行为被辟为不合理的和反对公共政策。(海等于off。,¶¶15—18、20 - 21)。最后,海先生称,该协议和承认不当行为应该是“空心和撤销”,因为它是“矛盾的判断砂执政党“否认制裁。(海等于off。,¶15)。讨论
“和解协议解决诉讼是由普通合同法的原则。“咖喱诉纽约警察局,726 f .增刊。2 d 273(s d n y 2010)(援引红球室内拆迁公司诉Palmadessa,辑)》第173卷第481页,484(2 d贵会。1999))。
a .重大违约
“这是没有妥善解决,在履行合同正在进行中,只有不履行的水平上涨至“实质性违反”将证明废除。“诺尔诉Equinox健身俱乐部,没有。02文明。9120、2003、、23018807,在* 6王(s d n y 12月22日,2003)(引用Krumme诉史蒂文斯西点,Inc .,辑)》第238卷第133页,143(2 d贵会。2000))。“一个裂口材料如果它失败的对象使合同各方和“剥夺[s]受害方的利益,这无可非议的预期。’”ESPN,公司诉专员办公室棒球,76 f .增刊。2 d 383
(s d n y 1999)(引用艾伦范斯沃斯,范斯沃斯在合同§8.16(3 d版1999));参见Krumme,238年在143年F.3d(“根据纽约州法律,废除是一个不同寻常的补救措施,适当的只在违约是发现材料和任性的,或者,如果不是故意的,所以实质性和基本以强烈倾向于失败的对象使合同各方。”)(内部引号和引文省略)。
在这里,事实表明,被告披露机密和解金额实质性违反和解协议。机密性的和解金额是非常重要的海先生,他已经造成不可挽回的伤害其披露。此外,它是不可能治愈的被告失败,因为披露信息不能再把私人的。看到里韦拉诉锋利,没有。1:08-cv-20 2010王2555065,在* 3(d .维尔京群岛,2010年6月21日)(Gambale引用
诉德意志,辑)》第377卷第133页,144 n 11(2 d贵会。2004))。
b .)弃权和禁止反言
即使在有一个重大违约,然而,“没有废除,违反合同。。。已经放弃该党一直被冤枉的。“纽约电话公司诉詹姆士镇的电话公司,282年纽约365、372、26东北虎2 d 295,297(1940)。当事人一方”已经实际知识(一个)违约和继续执行在和接受合同的好处,这种持续的性能构成一个弃权的违约。“国民西敏寺银行,美国诉。罗斯,130主656(s d n y 1991),等于off会接头公称Yaeger诉国民西敏寺,962 F.2d 1(2 d贵会。1992);参见艾默生电气公司诉资产管理协会的纽约,Inc .,没有。08 - cv - 1489 976051,在* 7王(e d n y 2012年3月20日)(“接受效益根据合同与知识的错误的构成放弃错了。’”)(引用纽约电话有限公司,在372年,26日282纽约东北虎2 d在297 - 98年);赫尔姆斯利矛,公司诉西德意志地方银行,692 f .增刊。194、204、、1988年s d n y)(注意“有权解除合同[a]必须锻炼后马上[][]的政党学错[,]和接受福利在[]合同[]错误的知识构成豁免”(内部引用省略))。因此,“一个原告是estopped从追求一个违反合同声称当这样的原告有“接受[]的好处,尽管知识的协议违反了。。。。’”。盖乐葛斯诉前RX,Inc .,没有。04 - cv - 773 - 4279526 - -,2008西城在* 13(w d n y 2008年9月15日)(引用查宾诉查宾,295 A.D.2d 389、391、744 n y年代2 d 181(2 d Dep不是2002))。
“一个弃权将不会被推断从沉默或纯粹的不作为,”查宾,295 A.D.2d在391 n y年代2 d在182 - 83;相反,放弃“要求当事人estopped注意某些事实,意识到它们,选择不去利用它们。“盖乐葛斯,2008年,在* 13王4279526(内部引号和引文省略)。“[我]n除了意识的事实在所谓的违反是建立一个原告的宽容,在寻求司法救济及时还必须被证实是一个自愿和故意决定“建立弃权。id在* 14。
在这种情况下,海先生,在得知被告违反,没有利用这些事实被及时维护自己的权利,解除协议;相反,他自愿和故意选为定型全额支付结算通过发送到被告作为同意和接受利益承诺他——驳回被告申请批准。海先生继续享受这效益和没有抗议被告披露和解金额超过两个月,直到,显然受到法官砂的决定拒绝制裁局域网,女士海先生得出结论,他也不再是危险的制裁作为一个法律问题,因此不再需要他的意料之外的好处和接受从被告在过去的前九周。2在这种情况下,海先生不是有权寻求废除协议。看到的,例如,Accusoft公司诉Palo,237 F.3d 31,55 56(1日圆。2001)(肯定拒绝废除声称,方违反了保密条款的和解协议和非违约方继续接受
2这一点并没有迷失在被告arguepersuasively,“为了违背和解协议”、“[奥。]海现在试图重塑了什么transpiredin光的法官砂的决定,否认制裁hisformer客户。。。。在两个月的settlementconference直到法官砂的决定,(奥。]海没有抱怨或挑战的有效性和解。他的所有通信这个法院和[d]efendants expressedany出版的有关问题ofWrongdoing承认,无意披露和解金额,oralleged胁迫。“(被告的法律备忘录反对派toMing海的运动留出和解协议,在4)。
协议的好处了几个月,直到“它已得到所有
和解协议的好处,它可能会“之前
寻求废除)。通过继续履行义务
在和接受协议的好处,而不是立即
行使解除权根据被告的认识
违约,海先生放弃,现在estopped确立,他的
在此基础上要求废除3
c .误传/欺诈性的诱因
海下认为,尽管和解协议
不需要确认的不当行为被保持
机密,他“不期望[]和预测[]”,它“会
被使用(即。发表]在这样一个恶意的方式”
被告,(海等于off。,¶9),谁,海先生称,“利用他们
与人联系在中国高层政治。。。在
3即便海先生没有放弃他的废除声称,这也被禁止由选举的补救措施教义。“一个partycannot‘选继续与合同,继续receivebenefits从它,此后为废除ortotal提起诉讼违约。’”ESPN,76 f .增刊。2 d在392(引用麦克法兰& associates公司诉Noxell Corp .,93年文明。5192、1994、、369324、* 4王
(s d n y 7月13日,1994))。在这里,在这里,”一个党与渡终止(该协议)选择继续,onlyinference绘制的是,该党将得到一个worthwhilebenefit从它的契约关系。因此,党'selection继续而不是结束合同本质上mootsits法律理由终止。一旦一个聚会recognizescontractual好处后的重大违约,违约thatparticular不能再被认为是thecontract的对立面,它不再能作为基础。”终止Id。
设置了一个媒体战争旨在破坏[他]和[他的]法律实践摧毁。“(海等于off。,¶7)。海先生声称被告没有“增益[他的]的知情同意th(ese)类型的策略和行为”,因为“他们的整个计划是让[他]到这个陷阱诡计和谎言。“(海等于off。,¶9)。
“‘的元素要求废除基于欺诈是误传,隐瞒或保密的一个重要事实;一个有意欺骗;而受伤从正当由受害方的依赖。’”德鲁克公司诉宏观基金有限公司,290 f . App 'x 441(2 d贵会。2008)(引用艾伦诉WestPoint-Pepperell,Inc .,945 F.2d 40,44(2 d贵会。1991))。此外,“一个政党寻求解除合同的理由是它是欺骗性地诱导必须证明所谓的陈述是“材料”,因为它影响了党的决定进入合同。“谢菲尔德商业集团。
诉克莱门特,792 F.2d 282(2 d贵会。1986)。
在这里,海先生甚至不能建立的第一个元素他的要求。作为被告正确地指出,和解协议清楚地指出,中文和英文版本的承认不当行为将被提交给法院和向公众开放。海先生完全意识到这个事实和预期,其出版物将负面影响他的声誉作为一个律师在华人社区,他承认在他写给我的钱伯斯在2012年3月3日。(第一海的信(“一旦语句[是]公开,我的客户,实践[,]和我的站作为一个职业在华人社区将会受到影响。”))。和解协议,并承认过错发表或进行更广泛的讨论在中国媒体或造成更多的破坏,海先生比他预计的名声并不等于误传的被告。看到的,例如,鲍威尔诉Omnicom,辑)》第497卷第124页,128(2 d贵会。2007)(“当一方使一个深思熟虑的、战略的选择来解决,法院不能减轻他的,因为他选择不正确的评估后果。”)。也没有任何事实表明隐瞒或保密的被告,维持一个索赔虚假陈述或欺诈的诱因。因此,海先生不能解除协议在此基础上,他声称必须失败。
d .不正当影响、威胁、和胁迫
海先生还宣称被告强迫他进入和解协议“通过过度的影响、威胁、胁迫[,]和其他被禁止的行为。“(海等于off。,¶10)。具体来说,海先生宣称,通过提供他一个有限的时间复习并签署和解文书工作的同时,提醒他,通过解决此案,他是“避免国家的法庭行动和酒吧纪律,”被告制造了一个“非法”“威胁[]的律师在一个未决民事物质纪律”“为了迫使[他]同意支付5000美元”,“从而邀请[他]讲价去抱怨“违反纽约的职业行为的规则。(海等于off。,¶11;肯定明海日期为2012年7月12日(“海回答等于off。”),¶¶2 - 5)。海先生还宣称,在他签署了协议,被告威胁他在他们的电话2012年3月3日,由“要求[他]不要发送信件法官弗朗西斯了和[]把它背或坏事会发生在[他]。“(海等于off。,¶13)。海先生声称,“被告威胁公顷[d]已经把[他]在一个国家的极端焦虑,[他]不能理性思考在th(ose)威胁在其他压力和签署了自我归罪的承认错误,承认所有的错误,[他]实际上并没有提交[]。“(海等于off。,¶12)。
作为一个初步的事,海先生未能及时寻求废除基础上的不正当影响或胁迫构成放弃除非他的主张。看到的,例如,VKK公司诉国家足球联盟,辑)》第244卷第114页,122 - 23(2 d贵会。2001)(“[T]他的人声称胁迫必须迅速行动来否认合同。。。或者他将被认为已放弃权利来这么做。。。[和]已经批准它。一个党可能批准一项合同。。。进入被迫通过有意地接受福利根据合同,通过保持沉默或默许合同一段时间后,他有机会避免它,或者通过作用于它,履行它,或肯定地承认它。“(内部引用和标点符号省略));2百老汇
l l c诉瑞士信贷第一波士顿抵押贷款资本l l c,没有。00文明。5773、2001、、410074年西城,* 12(s d n y 2001)(“当事人已经接受了一个协议的好处,然后试图拒绝这项协议在地上的强制,它必须在及时或任何异议是放弃和协议批准。“(内部引号和引文省略))。
海博的胁迫失败的基础还声称的优点。“根据纽约州法律,一方声称这是过度影响进入一个契约关系必须证明它简约的情况下显示一个“关系的控制”的存在,“强”的两党嬗变有影响力的其他“摧毁较弱的一方的自由意志和用它的[其它]。“在再保险果然,没有。06文明。461、2007、、2034301,在* 4王(s d n y 7月17日,2007)(引用太阳森林公司诉Shvili,152 f .增刊。2 d 367
(s d n y 2001))。“这是一个巨大的负担,一方来满足。“Id”。从本质上讲,一个政党寻求无效合同必须证明它是操纵签订合同的行为结果比甚至压力,无论多么糟糕,因为不正当影响相当于一种欺骗。“Id。(省略了内部引用和标点符号)。海先生面临的负担在证明胁迫”是更大的”,因为他必须显示:“(1)一个威胁,(2)非法,(3)导致非自愿接受合同条款,(4)因为环境许可别无选择。“Id。(引用马赛厄斯诉雅各布斯167 f .增刊。2 d 606(s d n y 2001))。
在某种程度上海博的不正当影响和胁迫声称是基于被告被指控的违反纽约的职业行为规则,他们失败:被告违反任何规则在本管辖。很明显,海先生没有引用任何控制权威支持他的论点,因为,事实上,没有。有关纽约规则,7 - 105博士(一个),“禁止表示和威胁陈述的刑事指控当目的是影响一个解决民事纠纷;纪律规定不接受行政或纪律的指控,可能会威胁或提出有关民事纠纷,无论目的。“纽约州律师协会委员会在职业道德,舆论772号在* 1(2003);看到7 - 105博士(A)(“一个律师不得存在,参与展示,或威胁当前刑事指控仅仅是为了获得一种优势在民事问题。”)。纽约州律师协会,2003年解决这个非常的问题,“总结[d],威胁或实际提出投诉,。。。行政机构或纪律当局谎言的范围之外的7 - 105博士(一个)。。。。(而)存在道德观点在这个和其他司法管辖区(如。,县、纽约和伊利诺斯州和马里兰州)中提起诉讼的威胁与行政机构或纪律权威受到违反7 - 105博士(a)或其类似物。。。。我们拒绝,一般类比根据具体的语言7 - 105博士(),它只关注“刑事指控。“id在* 4。因此,所谓的“威胁”包含在奥莫的电子邮件甚至没有上升到水平的律师的不当行为,更不用说阈值需要建立一个索赔的胁迫和乘人之危而。
这些主张也好不了在某种程度上来说,他们是基于被告涉嫌恐吓电话到海先生2012年3月3日:海先生已经签署了协议,之前的一天。虽然他描述他的2012年3月2日的信(这促使涉嫌电话从被告)为“表达[ing][他的]困难和挫折压力下签署“协议,更准确地描述为一个事后试图减少和解金额,海先生已经同意了。(第一海的信(“我只同意签署了屈辱和自我归罪的语句不改变甚至一个词,因为我希望我可以得到一些宽大处理货币好。。。。我将为你的荣誉可能先生讲话莫,修复和解金额为4000美元。"))。在任何情况下,无论内容之后的电话对话海先生和被告可能是,它不可能提供基础海先生声称被告得到他的签名协议通过施加压力在他已经签署了协议。因此,他的不正当影响和胁迫声称是缺乏法律依据,和他的运动来解除协议在这些理由必须否认。
e .显失公平
海先生进一步认为,该协议应被废除,因为它是不合理的。“不正当”需要一些显示缺乏有意义的选择部分一方连同合同条款是不合理地有利于对方。“在再保险,2007 - 2034301 -,果然西城在* 3(引用国家诉Avco金融服务公司,纽约502 d 383、389、429 n y年代2 d 181,185(1980)(内部引号省略))。“一个不合理的协议已经被描述为一个“如没有(人)在[他的]的感觉,而不是在错觉会让一方面,不诚实和公平的(人)将接受在其他”,在那里,由此产生的不平等是“如此强大和表现为震惊良心和混淆的判断任何(人)的常识。“Id”。(引用基督教诉基督徒,42纽约2 d 63、71、396 n y年代2 d 817,823(1977))。
海博的不正当索赔似乎依靠他所标识的“过度和不合理的行为通过[]被告”,总之,相当于一个“清单不公正”总体废除。这个论点失败。海先生,一个执业律师,协商和解条款与被告在我面前和自愿签署了承认过错考虑到被告的同意解雇他们的制裁运动与偏见反对他。和解条款并非不合理地对被告人有利的,也不做周围的情况表明,海先生面临一个缺乏有意义的选择在进入该协议。因此,该协议不应留出显失公平的基础上。
f .公共政策
海先生还认为,该协议应该被驳回,因为它违反了公共政策。“对于一个合同无效后对公共政策,它必须违反法律的国家,是否发现在宪法、法规或法院的判决。“米尔斯诉珠穆朗玛峰再保险公司410 f .增刊。2 d 243(s d n y 2006)(引用新英格兰相互人寿保险公司。
诉卡鲁索,纽约732 d 74、81、538 n y年代2 d 217,221(1989))。除了他的徒劳的指控被告被指控的违反有关纽约的职业行为规则,海先生不引用一个法令、规则或法院的决定,将支持空洞和解协议。
g .法官砂的裁决
最后,海先生认为,和解协议应该被废除,因为“这是矛盾的判断砂执政党“否认制裁局域网女士。(海等于off。,¶15;海回答等于off。,¶¶45 57)。具体来说,海先生认为,“承认不当行为实际上是一个声明当事人的法律意见,变成错误和矛盾的[法官砂的]发现和结论的法律”,因此“必须声明不正确的。“(海回答各位Aff¶¶48岁,54岁,49 57)。然而,承认过错是道歉海先生对被告人为自己的行为,而不是一个法律声明。因此,它是没有法律不符合法官砂的后续的裁决。结论
上面的原因出发,海博的运动来解除和解协议(记事表没有。103)应该被剥夺。根据28事项§636(b)(1)和规则72、6(一个),和6(d)的联邦规则民事诉讼的,当事人应当有
- 回复 再来看戏
- 看您说的，清晰版本怎么办？？这里无法上传附件
广告: 就是看不请那个， 才在这里等雷锋来。
你这军将的， 将得我不好意思。翻译太累， 我受不了。等看到清晰版本后， 我捡重点瞎评论两句吧。
嘿嘿。 ...
- 回复 广告
- 就是看不请那个， 才在这里等雷锋来。
再来看戏: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1793486960
也请你好心翻译成中文
你这军将的， 将得我不好意思。翻译太累， 我受不了。等看到清晰版本后， 我捡重点瞎评论两句吧。
嘿嘿。
- 回复 我就是局部地区个别人
- 普渡的博文里就有啊。还提供了PDF下载
- 回复 再来看戏
- http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1793486960
也请你好心翻译成中文
